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Abstract. This paper characterizes social welfare functions for different
scales of individual utility measurement in distinct population subgroups.
Different combinations of ordinal, interval, ratio, and translation scales
are studied. We consider situations when utility comparisons among
subgroups of individuals by unit and/or zeropoint can or cannot be made,
that is when subgroup utility scales are dependent or independent. We
show that for combinations of independent subgroup utility scales every
corresponding social welfare function is fully determined by the opinions
of only one subgroup of individuals when there is not more than one
subgroup with ratio or translation scale measurable utilities, otherwise
it also might be determined by the union of subgroups corresponding to
ratio and translation scales, and is in accord with the utility scales of the
decisive coalition. We also investigate social welfare functions admissible
given various combinations of interval scales with a common unit that
combine individual utilities from different subgroups, or with a common
zero that lead to existence of a dictatorial subgroup.
Keywords: Arrovian social choice, social welfare function, interpersonal
utility comparisons.
1 Introduction
In Arrow’s (1963) famous impossibility theorem, individual preferences are or-
dinally measurable and not interpersonally comparable. In a number of studies
(Sen (1970), Roberts (1980a, b), d’Aspremont (1985), Yanovskaya (1988, 1989),
Bossert and Weymark (1996)), more restrictive measurability-comparability as-
sumptions have been proposed and investigated. These studies show that under
different measurability-comparability conditions for individual preferences, non-
dictatorial social choice rules exist. However, in these studies, the measurement
scales for individual preferences are assumed to be of the same type across the
entire society.
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The goal of this paper is to study Arrovian social choice problems when indi-
vidual preferences in disjoint subgroups of individuals are measured by different
scale types, in other words, when separate subgroups of individuals admit dif-
ferent types of information. This situation is common in real decision making.
A typical example is the partitioning of a human society into families which in
turn consist of individuals. If an outsider is making the comparisons based on
reports from individuals, it is reasonable to suppose that the kind of information
available within and between families will be different in general. Indeed, the
kinds of utility comparisons that can be made within a family cannot be made
between people who do not know each other.
We adopt the welfarist approach to social choice and assume that only in-
dividual utilities matter for ranking a feasible set of social alternatives. In an
Arrovian social choice problem, this is implied by Pareto Indifference and In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives; the social choice rule can be equivalently
described either in terms of a social welfare ordering — a social ordering of the
admissible profiles of individual utilities (admissibility is understood as the sat-
isfaction of several a priori appealing conditions), or in terms of a social welfare
function — a function that represents a social welfare ordering and measures
social welfare. Various assumptions concerning the measurability and interper-
sonal comparability of utility can be formalized by partitioning the set of feasible
individual profiles of utility functions and requiring the social welfare ordering
to be constant over a cell of the partition.
In Sect. 2, we introduce basic definitions and notation and provide a formal
statement of the problem. In Sect. 3, various combinations of independent sub-
group scales that lead to the existence of a decisive coalition are considered. It
is proved that if there is not more than one subgroup of individuals with ratio or
translation scale measurable utilities, then the decisive coalition is equal to one
of the subgroups, otherwise the decisive coalition may coincide with the union
of the latter subgroups. Sect. 4 studies different combinations of dependent in-
terval subgroup scales. Sect. 5 provides some concluding remarks. Some proofs
are given in Appendix.
2 The framework
Consider a society consisting of a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of n ≥ 2 individuals.
LetX be a set of at least three alternatives and letR denote the set of all possible
preference orderings over X. The members of R are assumed to be weak orders,
i.e., complete, reflexive and transitive binary relations. A social choice problem
is a triple 〈X,N, {Ri}i∈N 〉, where {Ri}i∈N is a profile of individual preferences
Ri ∈ R, i ∈ N . To introduce measurability/comparability assumptions, we
consider individual preferences represented as individual utilities, which may be
interpreted as measurements of these preferences. So, let U be the set of all
real-valued functions defined on X × N : for any u ∈ U , let u(x, i) denote the
ith individual utility at the alternative x ∈ X. A social welfare functional is a
mapping f :D → R, where D ⊆ U is the domain of f . We assume that f satisfies
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three welfarism axioms:
Unrestricted Domain. D = U , i.e., f is defined for all u ∈ U .
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For any u, u′ ∈ D and A ⊆ X,
if u(x, i) = u′(x, i) for all x ∈ A and i ∈ N , then R:A = R′:A, where R = f(u)
and R′ = f(u′). (R:A denotes the restriction of R to A ⊆ X.)
Pareto Indifference. For any pair x, y ∈ X and for all u ∈ D, if u(x, i) = u(y, i)
for all i ∈ N , then xIy, where I denotes the indifference relation corresponding
to R = f(u).
According to the welfarism theorem (D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), and Ham-
mond (1979)), these three axioms ensure that only individual utilities matter
when ranking social alternatives, so any vector u = (u1, . . . , un) in the n-
dimensional Euclidian space IRn can be considered as a profile of individual
utilities for the society N ; here ui is the utility of ith individual. From this
perspective, a solution to a social choice problem can be regarded as a social
welfare ordering (SWO), which is a weak order R∗ on IRn, the set of possible
profiles of utility vectors. We assume that R∗ also satisfies
Weak Pareto (WP). For all u, v ∈ IRn, if ui > vi for all i ∈ N , then uP ∗v,
where P ∗ denotes the strict preference relation corresponding to R∗.
A function W : IRn → IR1 represents the SWO R∗ if for all u, v ∈ IRn
uR∗v ⇐⇒W (u) ≥W (v).
The representation W is called a social welfare function (SWF). By WP, any
SWF W is strictly increasing, i.e., for all u, v ∈ IRn
u v =⇒W (u) > W (v).
We impose one more restriction on an SWO R∗. We require R∗ to be con-
tinuous.
Continuity (C). For all u ∈ IRn, the sets {v ∈ IRn|vR∗u} and {v ∈ IRn|uR∗v}
are closed in IRn.
Continuity guarantees the existence of a continuous SWF (see Debreu (1954)).
In what follows byDn, we denote the diagonal of IRn. Let for any real c, cN be
a vector in IRn with all components equal to c and let γ(c) = {u ∈ IRn|W (u) = c}
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be a c-level surface of the SWF W ; obviously, for every u ∈ IRn, γ(W (u)) is a
level surface of W containing u.
Because of continuity and strict monotonicity of all SWF, every level surface
of any SWF intersects a diagonal Dn of IRn and, moreover, this intersection
is a singleton. So, a natural scale for an SWF arises: since every SWF W is
defined up to a strictly increasing transform, then, without loss of generality, it
may be assumed that for any u ∈ IRn, W (u) = c, with c defined by the equality
γ(W (u)) ∩Dn = {cN}.
In the classic case of Arrow, utilities are ordinally measurable and interper-
sonally non-comparable. More generally, within the SWO framework, the degree
of measurability and comparability of utility inside the society N can be speci-
fied by a class of invariance transforms Φ, where each transform φ ∈ Φ is a list of
functions φ = {φi}i∈N , φi: IR1 → IR1, with the property that for all u, v ∈ IRn
uR∗v ⇐⇒ (φu)R∗(φv), (1)
where φu = {φiui}i∈N . In what follows, if we wish to specify that the transforms
of a class Φ apply to a particular society N , we use the notation ΦN ; when there
is no ambiguity, the index N will be omitted.
For a class Φ to be a scale in the sense of the standard theory of measurement
it has to satisfy the stronger condition of being a group (see Phanzagl, (1971)).
Different scale types for individual utility measurement have been examined
in the literature (Roberts (1980b), d’Aspremont (1985), Bossert and Weymark
(1996)). Next we list the invariance classes to be considered here, the most of
them are scales.
Ordinal Measurability (OM). φ ∈ Φ iff φ is a list of any strictly increasing
transforms φi, i ∈ N .
Ordinal Measurability and Full Comparability (OFC). φ ∈ Φ iff φ is a
list of identical strictly increasing transforms, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N ,
φi(t) = φ0(t), where φ0 is a strictly increasing function independent of i.
Cardinal Measurability (CM). φ ∈ Φ iff φ is a list of any strictly increasing
affine transforms, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N , φi(t) = αi+βit for some real
αi and real βi > 0.
Cardinal Measurability and Origin Comparability (COC). φ ∈ Φ iff φ
is a list of strictly increasing affine transforms with a common constant term,
i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N , φi(t) = α+ βit for some real α and βi > 0 with
α independent of i.
Notice that a class of COC transforms is not a scale since it does not possess
the group property. All the others are scales.
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Cardinal Measurability and Unit Comparability (CUC). φ ∈ Φ iff φ is a
list of strictly increasing affine transforms with a common unit, i.e., for any real
t and all i ∈ N , φi(t) = αi + βt for some real αi and β > 0 with β independent
of i.
Cardinal Measurability and Full Comparability (CFC). φ ∈ Φ iff φ is a
list of identical strictly increasing affine transforms, i.e., for any real t and all
i ∈ N φi(t) = α+ βt for some real α and β > 0, both independent of i.
Ratio-Scale Measurability (RSM). φ ∈ Φ iff φ is a list of strictly increasing
affine transforms with zero constant term, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N ,
φi(t) = βit for some βi > 0.
Ratio-Scale Measurability and Full Comparability (RSF). φ ∈ Φ iff φ is
a list of identical strictly increasing affine transforms with zero constant term,
i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N , φi(t) = βt for some β > 0 independent of i.
Translation-Scale Measurability (TSM). φ ∈ Φ iff φ is a list of strictly
increasing affine transforms whose unit term is 1, i.e., for any real t and all
i ∈ N , φi(t) = αi + t for some real αi.
Translation-Scale Measurability and Full Comparability (TSF). φ ∈ Φ
iff φ is a list of identical strictly increasing affine transforms whose unit term is
1, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N , φi(t) = α+ t for some real α independent of
i.
The considered invariant transform classes can be naturally split into two
types — one-parameter and two-parameter . Transform classes of the second
type are those that contain two-parameter affine transforms (OM, OFC, CM,
COC, CUC, CFC), and of the first type that admit affine transforms with only
one free parameter, i.e., either with a zero constant term (RSM, RSF) or with
an a priori fixed unit equal to one (TSM, TSF).
Under the conditions imposed, the Arrovian social choice problem in the in-
formational environment introduced by an invariance class Φ can be equivalently
described in terms of SWF W which
1) is a continuous real-valued function defined on IRn such that W (cN ) = c
for any real c;
2) is nondecreasing1, i.e., for all u, v ∈ IRn,
u ≥ v =⇒W (u) ≥W (v); (2)
1 This holds because W is continuous and strictly increasing.
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3) is invariant under invariance transforms of class Φ, i.e., for any φ ∈ Φ
and for all u, v ∈ IRn,
W (u) ≥W (v)⇐⇒W (φu) ≥W (φv). (3)
The main concern of this paper is the situation where the entire society N is
partitioned into m disjoint subgroups of individuals, i.e., N = N1∪N2∪· · ·∪Nm
with Ni ∩ Nj = ∅ for i 6= j. It is assumed that an SWF W defined on IRn for
different subgroups of variables indexed by Nk, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, may admit
invariance transforms of different invariance classes ΦNk , which amounts to W
being invariant under transforms of a class ΦN such that ΦN = {ΦNk}mk=1, i.e.,
for every φ ∈ ΦN for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, φNk = {φi}i∈Nk ∈ ΦNk . In other words
ΦN is the Cartesian product of the subgroup classes of transforms ΦNk . It is
worth noting that the class ΦN has to satisfy condition (1); however, in general,
even if all invariant classes ΦNk are scales, ΦN may not be a scale: the condition
of being a group may no longer hold. For example, any combination of CFC
scales with a common zero is not a scale.
To complete this section we introduce some additional notation. By nk we
denote the cardinality of Nk. It is obvious that Σmk=1nk = n. For any u ∈ IRn
and all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let uNk be a subvector of u that belongs to IRnk and that
is composed of components ui with i ∈ Nk. IRNk is the coordinate subspace of
IRn induced by coordinates with indices from Nk, i.e.
IRNk = {v ∈ IRn|vi = 0, i /∈ Nk}.
Denote by
DNk = {u ∈ IRNk |ui = uj , i, j ∈ Nk, & ui = 0, i /∈ Nk}
the diagonal of the coordinate subspace IRNk . LD is the subspace of IRn spanned
by the diagonals DNk , k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. It is easy to see that every u ∈ LD,
u = {ui}i∈N , has the form ui = vk for all i ∈ Nk under some v = v(u) ∈ IRm,
i.e., all variables in LD indexed by the same subgroup of indices have the same
value.
For any vector u ∈ IRn, let uˆ (uˇ) be the vector in IRn with all components
equal to the largest (smallest) component of u. As usual, we designate the mean
value of a vector u ∈ IRn by u¯, i.e., u¯ = (∑ni=1 ui)/n. The nonnegative and
positive orthants in IRn are denoted by IRn+ and IR
n
++, respectively, i.e.,
IRn+ = {u ∈ IRn|ui ≥ 0, i ∈ N, & u 6= 0},
IRn++ = {u ∈ IRn|ui > 0, i ∈ N}.
In what follows, we also borrow the notion of a fan defined in Bossert and
Weymark (1996). For a vector u ∈ IRn, the fan generated by u is
Y (u) = {u′ ∈ IRn|u′ = θ1n + λu, θ ∈ IR, λ ∈ IR+}.
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A subset Y of IRn is a fan if it is a fan generated by some u ∈ IRn.
In what follows, we use the notation N (2)k if we need to emphasize that an
SWF with respect to variables indexed by Nk is invariant under two-parameter
type transforms, and we denote by N (1) a union of all subgroups Nk correspond-
ing to one-parameter type scales. Any subgroup of variables N (2)k or N
(1) are
called a two-parameter or one-parameter type subgroup, respectively. When it
is necessary to indicate that an SWF is invariant with respect to the subgroup
of variables indexed by Nk under Φ transforms, we use the notation Nk(Φ). If
it is desirable to stress what class of invariance transforms is admissible for an
SWF, we use the designation SWF(Φ), and an SWF(Φ) characterization, we call
an Φ-characterization.
3 Independent subgroup scales
I. Existence of a decisive coalition.
First, we examine situations with mutually independent subgroup scales for
which a decisive coalition equal to either a two-parameter type (OM, OFC, CM,
CUC, CFC) subgroup of individuals or to the union of all one-parameter type
(RSM, RSF, TSM, TSF) subgroups must exist.
The subgroup classes of transforms ΦNk , k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, are mutually inde-
pendent if, for any two distinct k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for every i ∈ Nk1 , and for
every j ∈ Nk2 , the transforms φi ∈ ΦNk1 and φj ∈ ΦNk2 are independent, i.e.,
if the transforms that apply to the variables of one subgroup are independent
of the transforms that apply to any other subgroup. Mutual Independence pre-
serves the group property and guarantees ΦN to be the direct product of groups
ΦNk when each of the ΦNk is a group, i.e., it guarantees ΦN to be a scale if all
ΦNk are scales. It should be stressed that Mutual Independence is a property of
the set of subgroup classes of transforms {ΦNk}mk=1, not of individual transforms
within these classes.
Theorem 3.1. Let {Nk}mk=1 be a partition of N and let W be a continuous,
nondecreasing real-valued function defined on IRn, that is invariant with respect
to variables indexed by Nk under any one of the invariance transform classes
listed above. Invariance transforms proper to distinct subgroups of indices Nk
are assumed to be mutually independent. Then, either there exists a unique inte-
ger k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} corresponding to a two-parameter type subgroup of variables
indexed by N (2)k such that the function W has the form





for all u ∈ IRn or, for all u ∈ IRn, W is independent of all two-parameter type
variables and depends only on one-parameter type variables, i.e., W has the form
W (u) =W (uN(1)).
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Moreover, W is fully characterized in accordance with the invariance transforms
admissible to the subset of variables it determined by.
Theorem 3.1 shows that with mutually independent subgroup scales, every
SWF is either determined by only one subgroup of two-parameter type variables,
or is completely independent of all such variables and is fully determined by the
one-parameter subgroups. Theorem 3.1 allows us to construct an SWF char-
acterization for various combinations of arbitrary independent subgroup utility
scales on the basis of well-known results for social choice problems with the same
measurement scales of individual utilities for the entire society and the charac-
terization results for combinations of only one-parameter type RSM, RSF, TSM,
and TSF scales which are discussed later (see Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 be-
low). For example, if in any one subgroup of individuals, utilities are measured
in OM or CM scales, then either a dictator from this subgroup exists or the SWF
is completely independent of this subgroup’s utilities and is fully determined by
the rest of the society in accordance with their utility scales.
A particular case of independent CUC scales for disjoint subgroups was in-
vestigated by Plata-Pe´rez (1994). Various combinations of mutually indepen-
dent OM, OFC, CM, CUC, and CFC scales, i.e. only combinations of mutually
independent two-parameter type scales, were studied in Khmelnitskaya (1996,
1999)), and Khmelnitskaya and Weymark (2000), who employed two different
proof techniques. Our proof strategy for the general case is similar to that
developed in Khmelnitskaya and Weymark (2000).
To prove Theorem 3.1, we employ the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let W be a continuous, nondecreasing real-valued function defined
on IRn. Suppose that W is invariant with respect to some variable ui0 , i0 ∈ N ,
under strictly increasing two-parameter affine transforms and with respect to the
other variables under any one of the invariance transform classes listed above
possibly different for different subgroups of variables. Then, either the function
W has the form
W (u) =W (ui0)
for all u ∈ IRn or, for all u ∈ IRn, W is independent of ui0 and has the form
W (u) =W (uN\{i0}).
The proofs of Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.1 are given in Appendix.
II. Combinations of ratio and translation scales.
Now we restrict consideration to different combinations of independent one-
parameter type RSM, RSF, TSM, and TSF subgroup scales that, in general, do
not give rise to only dictatorial subgroup characterization for an SWF. Note, that
combinations of different RSM subgroups do not require a separate study, since
this hypothesis is equivalent to supposing RSM invariance for the joint subgroup.
It should be noticed also that a few singleton RSF subgroups amounts to the
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condition of RSM invariance for the union of them. Therefore, it is enough
to consider only combinations of RSF subgroups. Similarly, we can easily see
that it suffices to study only combinations of TSF subgroups instead of different
combinations of TSM and TSF ones. Next, it is straightforward to check that if
we replace all TSM and TSF variables ui, i ∈ NT = ∪k∈1,mNk(TSM or TSF),
uNT ∈ IRnNT , by the variables vi = exp(ui), then vNT ∈ IRnNT++ and the variables
vi, i ∈ NT , turn out to be RSM or RSF variables, respectively.
In what follows we relay on the next general remark.
Remark 3.3. Suppose we examine a social choice problem for the society N in
the informational environment prescribed by the invariance class Φ (which, in
particular, may be a certain combination of subgroup scales). Assume also that
there are two other scales Φ′ and Φ′′ for which we know SWF characterizations.
Suppose moreover, that Φ′ ⊂ Φ ⊂ Φ′′, and assume that there exists a subset
LΦ ⊂ IRn, dimLΦ = m, such that for any W ∈ SWF(Φ), the restriction W |LΦ
to LΦ can be identified with a real-valued function W ∗ on IRm that admits
invariance transforms from the class Φ′′. Then we can state that an SWF(Φ)
possesses the Φ′-characterization that narrows to the Φ′′-characterization on LΦ.
Furthermore, if Φ is a certain combination of subgroup scales, i.e., N is parti-
tioned into m subgroups {Nk}mk=1 and Φ = ΦN = {ΦNk}mk=1, then, it is not
difficult to see, that for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for any fixed uˆN\Nk ∈ IRN\Nk ,
the Φ′-characterization of every SWF(ΦN ), considered as a function on IRnk , has
to be consistent with the ΦNk -characterization as well.
Now, let Φ be a combination of RSF subgroup scales, possibly different for
different k. Then RSF ⊂ Φ ⊂ RSM and for any SWF(Φ) W , its restriction
W |LD to LD can be identified with a real-valued function W ∗ defined on IRm
that is an SWF(RSM). Therefore, because of Remark 3.3 and applying the results
of Kaneko and Nakamura (1979), and of Tsui and Weymark (1997) for RSM-
characterization combined with the SWF characterization under RSF invariance
(see Roberts (1980b)) we arrive at
Theorem 3.4. Let {Nk}mR+mTk=1 be a partition of N , nR =
∑mR
k=1 nk, nT =∑mR+mT
k=mR+1
nk, and let W be a continuous, nondecreasing real-valued function
defined on IRnR++ × IRnT (resp. IRnR+ × IRnT), that is invariant with respect to
variables indexed by Nk under RSF transforms for k ∈ {1, . . . ,mR}, and under
TSF transforms for k ∈ {mR+1, . . . ,mR+mT }. Invariance transforms proper to
distinct subgroups of indices Nk are assumed to be mutually independent. Then
1) the function W (uNk , u˜N\Nk) for a fixed u˜N\Nk ∈ IRn−nk considered as a
function on IRnk , is homothetic on IRnk++ (resp. IR
nk
+ ) for k ∈ {1, . . . ,mR}, and
is translatable on IRnk for k ∈ {mR + 1, . . . ,mR +mT };
2) the function W restricted to the subspace LDR++×LDT (resp. LDR+ ×LDT )2,
i.e., for all u = {ui}i∈N ∈ IRn such that for every i ∈ N and for all k ∈
{1, . . . ,mR+mT } if i ∈ Nk, then ui = vk for a certain v = v(u) ∈ IRmR++ × IRmT
2 LD++ (resp. L
D
+) is defined analogously to L












with α = {αk}mR+mTk=1 ∈ IRmR+mT+ .
Tsui and Weymark (1997) show that under RSM invariance the only SWF
defined on all of IRn is a strongly dictatorial one. Thus, employing the similar
arguments as before, we obtain
Theorem 3.5. Let {Nk}mR+mTk=1 be a partition of N and let W be a continuous,
nondecreasing real-valued function defined on IRn, that is invariant with respect
to variables indexed by Nk under RSF transforms for k ∈ {1, . . . ,mR}, and under
TSF transforms for k ∈ {mR+1, . . . ,mR+mT }. Invariance transforms proper to
distinct subgroups of indices Nk are assumed to be mutually independent. Then,
either there exists a unique integer k ∈ {1, . . . ,mR} such that the function W
has the form
W (u) =W (uNk)
for all u ∈ IRn and is homothetic on IRnk or, for all u ∈ IRn, W depends only
on variables indexed by NT = ∪mk=1Nk(TSF), i.e.,
W (u) =W (uNT );
for every k ∈ {mR + 1, . . . ,mR + mT }, W is translatable on IRnk ; and on
LDT , i.e., for all u = {ui}i∈NT ∈ IRnT such that for every i ∈ NT and for
k ∈ {mR + 1, . . . ,mR + mT } if i ∈ Nk(TSF), then ui = vk for a certain v =





with α = {αk}mTk=1 ∈ IRmT+ .
4 Interrelations among subgroup scales
I. Interval scales with a common unit.
To obtain SWF characterization for various combinations of interval scales
with a common for the entire society unit we exploit again the observation done
in Remark 3.3.
Let Φ be a combination of CFC subgroup scales, possibly different for dif-
ferent k but with the same unit for all k. Then CFC ⊂ Φ ⊂ CUC and for
any SWF(Φ) W , its restrictionW |LD to LD can be identified with a real-valued
functionW ∗ defined on IRm that is an SWF(CUC). Therefore, utilizing the SWF
characterization under CUC and CFC invariance (Roberts (1980b), Bossert and
Weymark (1996)), we may state:
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Theorem 4.1. Let {Nk}mk=1 be a partition of N and let W be a continuous,
nondecreasing real-valued function defined on IRn, that is invariant with respect
to variables indexed by Nk under CFC transforms that may be different for dif-
ferent k but that have the same common unit. Then for all u ∈ IRn, W has the
form
W (u) = u¯+ θ(u− u¯)
under some continuous and homogeneous of the first degree function θ: IRn →
IR1, and, moreover,
1) on any fan Y in IRn and on a diagonal subspace LD, W is linear with
semipositive coefficients which, in general, depend on Y or LD respectively;
2) for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and any fixed u˜N\Nk ∈ IRn−nk , the function
W (uNk , u˜N\Nk) considered as a function on IR
nk , on every fan Y in IRnk is
linear with semipositive coefficients depending, in general, on Y .
Theorem 4.1 is tantamount to every level surface of W flattening on each fan
Y in IRn, on each cylinder Y ′ + uN\Nk where Y
′ is a fan in IRnk and uN\Nk ∈
IRn−nk , and on a diagonal subspace LD. In particular, the latter expresses the
fact that under the stated conditions, an SWF is always a weighted utilitarian
SWF if for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, all individual utilities have the same value within
every subgroup of individuals Nk.
It should be mentioned that if all subgroups Nk, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, are sin-
gletons, the hypothesis of Theorem 4.1 is equivalent to the condition of CUC-
invariance for all i ∈ N . Also, combinations of different CUC scales with a
common unit do not require separate study, since this amounts to supposing
CUC-invariance for the entire society.
For combinations of CUC and CFC scales, without loss of generality it suffices
to consider only the situation N = N1(CUC) ∪ N2(CFC), which in turn is
equivalent to the consideration of the combination of n1+1 CFC scales with n1
singleton subgroups.
Remark 4.2. As it was noted by Roberts (1980b), for the characterization of
weighted utilitarianism, TSM invariance is enough. Thus, the conclusion of
Theorem 4.1 concerning the linear form of the functionW on a diagonal subspace
LD still holds if we consider a combination of TSF subgroup scales instead of
that of CFC ones.
It is worth mentioning that if we consider the full continuum of different combi-
nations of scales for the entire society between CM and CFC for all individuals,
at ”point” CM we have Sen’s (1970) dictatorial result, between ”points” CM
and CUC there exists a dictatorial subgroup with a utilitarian rule (the result of
Plata-Pe´rez (1994) which is a particular case of Theorem 3.1 for various combi-
nations of independent among distinct subgroups CUC scales), at ”point” CUC
we arrive at a utilitarian rule for the entire society, between CUC and CFC we
arrive at Theorem 4.1, and at CFC we have the result of Roberts (1980b), and
Yanovskaya (1988).
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II. Interval scales with a common zero.
Next we show that every combination of interval scales with a common for
the entire society zero leads to existence of a dictatorial subgroup. It is not hard
to see that it suffices to consider only combinations of different CFC subgroup
scales with a common zero.
Return back to the proof of Theorem 3.1 (see Appendix) and notice that for
every combination of the subgroup scales ΦNk , k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for which W ∗ in
the first step of the proof has to be dictatorial and for which c˜ is independent of c
in the second step, there exists a dictatorial subgroup among the subgroups Nk.
Observe, that for the considered combinations these conditions are valid. Indeed,
first, W ∗ has to be invariant under strictly increasing affine transforms with a
common constant term which results in W ∗ to be dictatorial (see d’Aspremont
(1985)). Second, every two transforms φi and φj relevant to subgroups Nk and
N \Nk are any two strictly increasing affine transforms with the only restriction
that they have the same constant term, that combined with (3) obviously leads
for c˜ to be independent of c. These observations together with the result of
Roberts (1980b) for the CFC-characterization allow to prove
Theorem 4.3. Let {Nk}mk=1 be a partition of N and let W be a continuous,
nondecreasing real-valued function defined on IRn, that is invariant with respect
to variables indexed by Nk under CFC transforms that may be different for dif-
ferent k but that have the same common constant term. Then there exists a
unique integer k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, such that for all u ∈ IRn the function W (u) is
determined only by the set of variables Nk and has the form
W (u) = u¯Nk + θ(uNk − u¯Nk)
where θ: IRnk → IR1 is a continuous and homogeneous of the first degree function.
5 Concluding remarks
To conclude, it is worth noting that social orderings for problems with different
utility scales for separate subgroups of individuals may be obtained by aggre-
gating the individual utilities in two ways: either simultaneously over the entire
society, or first within subgroups with identical information and then integrating
the partially aggregated information. It is clear, that in the second case the sec-
ond stage of the aggregation is equivalent to aggregation with a smaller number
of individuals. However, there is no information available about the compara-
bility of utilities for this smaller number of individuals, and so the situation is
similar to that captured by the Arrovian conditions. Hence, every social order-
ing obtained by this way of aggregation is fully determined by the opinions of
only one subgroup of individuals and it is in accordance with the measurement
scales of its members’ utilities. But we can not draw the same conclusion when
we aggregate the individual utilities simultaneously over the entire society even
for the combinations of independent among subgroups scales. We can show that
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this is true for all combinations of independent two-parameter subgroup scales
with at most one one-parameter subgroup. However, if there are more than one
subgroup of individuals with ratio or translation scale measurable utilities, then
the social ordering may be determined by individual opinions of a few of them.
Meanwhile, the combinations of interval subgroup scales with a common for the
entire society zero give an example of combinations of dependent subgroup scales
that lead to existence of a dictatorial subgroup.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof (of Lemma 3.2). Fix any u ∈ IRn and consider the level surface γ(W (u))
of W containing u. Let u′ ∈ γ(W (u)), u′ 6= u. Assume that u′i0 6= ui0 . For any
α > 0 consider an admissible transform φ = {φi}ni=1,
φi(t) = φi(α, ui0 ; t) =
{
(1− α)ui0 + αt, i = i0,
t, i 6= i0.
By (3) for all α > 0, W (φu′) = W (φu). But for all α > 0, φu = u, and so
for all α > 0, φu′ ∈ γ(W (u)). If α = 1, then φu′ = u′. Therefore, the ray
starting from the point u˜ =
{
ui0 , i = i0
u′i , i 6= i0 and proceeding parallel to the i0-axis
passes through the point u′ and belongs to γ(W (u)). Using another transform
ψ = {ψi}ni=1 admissible under any α > 0,
ψi(t) = ψi(α, u′i0 ; t) =
{
(1− α)u′i0 + αt, i = i0,
t, i 6= i0,
we can check that the ray starting from u′ and running parallel to the i0-axis con-
tains the point u˜ and belongs to γ(W (u)). Hence, a whole straight line parallel
to the i0-axis and containing u′ lies completely in the level surface γ(W (u)).
Thus, if for the i0-variable on some fixed level surface γ of W , there exist
u′, u′′ ∈ γ, such that u′i0 6= u′′i0 , then for every u ∈ γ the whole straight line
containing u and parallel to the i0-axis belongs to γ. For any function invariant
under TSF transforms all level surfaces can be obtained from each other by a
shift along the diagonal of the utility space. All variables of W except RSM
(RSF) ones, and in particular the i0-variable, admit TSF transforms. With
respect to RSM (RSF) variables (if such exist) W is a homothetic function, and
so, under RSM transforms applied to some i-variable, i 6= i0, any straight line
orthogonal to the i-axis transforms into a parallel one. Hence, if in any level
surface of the function W , there exist two points with different i0-components,
then the function W is independent of the i0-variable. It follows immediately
that either for all u′ ∈ γ(W (u)) u′i0 = ui0 and, therefore, W (u) = W (ui0), or
W (u) is independent of the i0-variable. uunionsq
Proof (of Theorem 3.1). First, consider the subdomain LD in which all vari-
ables indexed by the same subgroup of indices have the same value. In the
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obvious way the restriction of W to LD can be identified with a continuous,
nondecreasing real-valued function W ∗ on IRm. This function W ∗ inherits the
invariance property from W and, hence, is invariant under CM transforms with
respect to all variables uk, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, corresponding to two-parameter type
subgroups N (2)k . Because of Lemma 3.2, applying an induction argument to all
CM variables sequentially, we can claim that either there exists a unique integer
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, corresponding to N (2)k such that the function W ∗ has the form
W ∗(u) =W ∗(uk)
for all u ∈ IRm or, for all u ∈ IRm, W ∗ depends only on variables uk relevant
to one-parameter type subgroups Nk, and so, restricted to LD, W depends only
on the variables indexed either by some N (2)k , k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, or by the entire
set of variables N (1). In what follows, the subgroup of variables determining W
on LD we denote by N0.
Second, for all i /∈ N0, fix the variables ui to be c and let uN0 be any arbitrary
vector in IRn0 . By (2), we have
W (uˆN0 , cN\N0) ≥W (uN0 , cN\N0) ≥W (uˇN0 , cN\N0).
Continuity then implies that there exists a real c˜ such that
W (c˜N0 , cN\N0) =W (uN0 , cN\N0).
Because of (3) and the assumption that the transforms for the subgroups N0
and N \ N0 are independent, c˜ does not depend on c. Thus, the last equality,
combined with the argument in step one, implies that W only depends on the
variables indexed by N0 when W is restricted to the subdomain of vectors in
which the individuals not in group N0 all have the same utility.
Third, we extend this result to the whole domain using a proof by con-
tradiction. If W does not only depend on the variables indexed by N0, there
must exist a vector of utilities uN0 for subgroup N0 and two vectors of utilities
vN\N0 , wN\N0 for the individuals in N \N0 such that
W (uN0 , vN\N0) > W (uN0 , wN\N0).
By (2), this inequality implies that
W (uN0 , vˆN\N0) > W (uN0 , wˇN\N0),
and this contradicts the conclusion in step two. Hence, W can only depend on
the variables indexed by N0.
Fourth, by the preceding argument, W can be identified with a function
W¯ on IRn0 . This function is continuous, nondecreasing, and is invariant under
transforms of the class Φ(0). The last statement in the theorem follows from
these observations. uunionsq
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